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JONAH LEHRER, HOW WE DECIDE 
ALAN M. WEINBERGER* 
Trial court judges are accustomed to a steady diet of emotionally charged 
cases in normal economic times.  But the inevitable by-product of the current 
financial crisis will be a flooding of dockets with cases of personal hardship 
involving loan and lease defaults, evictions and foreclosures.1  Trial judges will 
face the considerable challenge of drawing upon their emotional intelligence to 
enhance decision-making, while simultaneously keeping their emotions in 
check.  Would studying the experience of chess grandmasters, NFL 
quarterbacks, professional poker players, and airline pilots make trial judges 
better decision-makers?  If so, each judge’s chambers deserves its own copy of 
Jonah Lehrer’s How We Decide, which became affordable for bulk purchase 
by court administrators with its winter 2010 release in paperback.2 
Lehrer’s thesis is that anyone who makes difficult decisions can benefit 
from a more emotional thought process.3  He acknowledges the conventional 
wisdom that simple decisions of everyday life (like choosing what to have for 
dinner) are suitable for emotions, while difficult decisions require an 
analytically rigorous process of consciously considering alternatives and 
carefully weighing pros and cons.4  But he goes on to state that “the 
conventional wisdom about decision-making has got it exactly backward.”5  
According to Lehrer, the reality is counter-intuitive.  It is the easy decisions 
that are best suited to the rational brain.6  Deciphering more complex problems 
overwhelms the prefrontal cortex (PFC).7  Such decisions “require the 
processing powers of the super-computer of the mind”: the emotional center of 
the brain known as the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC).8  The hardest calls, 
 
* Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law.  A.B. 1972, J.D. 1975, University of 
Michigan. 
 1. Editorial, This Year’s Housing Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2010, at A20. 
 2. JONAH LEHRER, HOW WE DECIDE (2009). 
 3. See id. passim. 
 4. See id. at 237. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. LEHRER, supra note 2, at 237. 
 8. Id. at 40, 238. 
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says Lehrer, benefit from the most feeling.9  The more complex the decision, 
the greater the risk that too much conscious reflection will inundate the PFC 
with more data than it is capable of processing.10  The better strategy is to use 
the conscious mind to acquire the relevant information but then shift mental 
gears to a more emotional thought process for actual decision-making.11  “It 
might sound ridiculous, but it makes scientific sense: Think less about those 
items that you care a lot about.  Don’t be afraid to let your emotions choose.”12  
Lehrer’s advice in complex situations is to “always listen to your feelings.  
They know more than you do.”13 
The reason the emotional brain is so intelligent is that it has the capacity to 
turn mistakes into learning opportunities.14  The surprising wisdom of our 
emotions is a function of the spindle neuron, a highly flexible brain cell only 
found in humans and great apes, and only in the ACC.15  The interaction of 
these cells with dopamine neurons gives us the ability to learn from mistakes.16  
The constant adjustment of spindle neurons every time we make a mistake is 
the scientific basis for the process by which “teachable moments” occur.17  Bad 
outcomes can happen when a complex decision-maker fortifies himself against 
human emotion.  Consider the high-profile 2007 Colorado case involving a 
vacant parcel of land in Boulder with a magnificent Rocky Mountain view 
owned by Don and Susie Kirlin.18  Richard McLean, a retired judge and former 
Boulder mayor, and his wife, Edith Stevens, an attorney, filed suit to acquire 
title through adverse possession to enough of the Kirlins’ property to thwart its 
ever being developed and impairing the view from their home next door.19  
Finding that McLean and Stevens had crossed the Kirlins’ land to access their 
own backyard, kept a woodpile on the disputed property, and used the property 
to throw summer parties throughout the eighteen-year period of Colorado’s 
statute of limitations for trespass, District Court Judge James Klein awarded 
Plaintiffs one-third of the defendants’ land.20 
 
 9. Id. at 237. 
 10. Id. at 236. 
 11. See id. at 230–32. 
 12. LEHRER, supra note 2, at 245. 
 13. Id. at 238. 
 14. Id. at 249. 
 15. Id. at 40. 
 16. Id. at 41. 
 17. LEHRER, supra note 2, at 41. 
 18. Plaintiffs’ Verified Complaint at 1–2, McLean v. DK Trust, No. 06CV982 (Boulder Dist. 
Ct., Oct. 4, 2006). 
 19. Id. at 4. 
 20. Order at 1, 9, McLean v. DK Trust, No. 06CV982 (Boulder Dist. Ct., Oct. 17, 2007). 
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The intense public outcry following the decision, including well-publicized 
protest rallies on the disputed property, attracted national media coverage.21  
Song parodies reminiscent of Tom Lehrer appeared on the Internet.22  Bloggers 
even called upon bar officials to probe Stevens’ conduct for possible breach of 
the canons of professional responsibility.23 
A bill to prevent future bad faith land-grabs, enacted by the Colorado 
legislature with wide bipartisan support and signed into law by Governor Bill 
Ritter within a year of the decision, left Colorado with what may be the 
country’s most restrictive adverse possession law.24  An adverse possessor in 
Colorado will now have to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he 
believed in good faith that the land was actually his own.25  If this occurs, the 
judge in the case still has discretion to award the losing party damages and 
reimbursement for any property taxes paid during the eighteen-year period of 
adverse possession.26 
Could this train wreck have been avoided?  Where was Judge Klein’s little 
voice-inside-the-head to ask, “Must the common law lack common sense?”  
First-year property students would know how to finesse the decision: Award 
McLean and Stevens a prescriptive easement on these facts—but not title by 
adverse possession.  Their conduct fell well short of the substantial cultivation, 
improvement or enclosure required to establish the “actual” possession element 
under adverse possession doctrine in many states.27  In other jurisdictions, their 
conduct would also fall short of the common law good faith belief requirement 
that sometimes exists.28 
As further proof that American culture celebrates second chances, Judge 
Klein received 65.8% of the vote when he appeared on the ballot for retention 
in 2008.29  If Lehrer is correct about how the brain accumulates wisdom 
through error, Judge Klein will be a better decision-maker in the future. 
 
 21. See, e.g., DeeDee Correll, This Land is Now Their Land-So a Judge Rules, L.A. TIMES, 
Dec. 3, 2007, at A8. 
 22. Mark Frauenfelder, Songs Making Fun of Land Grab Case in Boulder, Colorado, BOING 
BOING (Jan. 9, 2008, 4:52 PM), http://boingboing.net/2008/01/09/songs-making-fun-of.html. 
 23. Tom McGhee, Panel Won’t Probe Boulder Land Ruling, DENVER POST (Nov. 21, 2007, 
11:39 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_7519098?source=pkg. 
 24. Act of Apr. 25, 2008, ch. 190, 2008 Colo. Sess. Laws 668 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. 
§ 38-41-101 (2008)). 
 25. COLO. REV. STAT. at § 38-41-101(3). 
 26. Id. § 38-41-101(5). 
 27. See, e.g., Walsh v. Ellis, 883 N.Y.S.2d 563, 565–56 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (finding 
occasional planting activities, minor repairs, and use of driveway was insufficient; regular 
cultivation, improvement, or substantial enclosure was required). 
 28. See, e.g., Halpern v. Lacy Inv. Corp., 379 S.E.2d 519, 521 (Ga. 1989) (“[T]he correct 
rule is that one must enter upon the land claiming in good faith the right to do so.”). 
 29. COLO. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABSTRACT OF VOTES CAST 
FOR THE 2008 PRIMARY 2008 GENERAL 132 (2008).  Voters may have been influenced by the 
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In deciding cases of first impression, judges often use their rational brain, 
searching in vain for precedent where none exists, before ultimately resorting 
to reasoning by analogy.30  This has led to bad outcomes.31  When faced with a 
problem for which there is no obvious answer, according to Lehrer, it is time 
for the decision-maker to use the emotional brain and let feelings come into 
play.32 
Consider the case of Popov v. Hayashi.33  Had he engaged in reasoning by 
analogy, Judge Kevin McCarthy almost surely would have awarded ownership 
of Barry Bonds’ single-season homerun record baseball to Patrick Hayashi, in 
whose hands (and then pocket) the loose ball came to rest in the right-field 
stands at San Francisco’s PacBell Park on October 7, 2001.34  But first in time, 
the ball had briefly been in the webbing of a glove worn by Alex Popov, who 
had tried to catch the ball in flight only to lose it after being tackled, roughly 
jostled and kicked, and perhaps bitten in the ensuing scrum.35  It undoubtedly 
occurred to Judge McCarthy that a baseball hit outside the field of play is very 
much like a wild animal, eligible for capture only by one who is ultimately 
able to deprive it of its natural liberty.36  But Judge McCarthy concluded that a 
 
recommendation of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Performance that Judge Klein, a 
fourth-generation Coloradan, be retained, although his was the lowest margin of any of the 
district court judges on the ballot.  Twentieth Judicial District, District Judges: Honorable James 
C. Klein, COLO. OFFICE OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION, http://www.coloradojudicial 
performance.gov/retention.cfm?ret=204 (last visited Apr. 9, 2011).  See also COLO. SEC’Y OF 
STATE, supra, at 127–33. 
 30. See Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force 
of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923, 959 (1996). 
 31. See, e.g., Hammonds v. Cent. Ky. Natural Gas Co., 75 S.W.2d 204, 206 (Ky. 1934) 
(comparing natural gas to wild animals, both by their nature of being wild and migratory).  Judge 
Osslo Stanley’s analogy in Hammonds earned “violent adverse criticism by many authors and law 
review writers.”  Tex. Am. Energy Corp. v. Citizens Fid. Bank & Trust Co., 736 S.W.2d 25, 27–
28 (Ky. 1987) (quoting Lone Star Gas Co. v. Murchison, 353 S.W.2d 870, 876 (Tex. 1962)). 
 32. See LEHRER, supra note 2, at 231–32.  Inability to obtain accurate and reliable feedback 
may impair judges’ capacity to use intuitive thinking successfully.  Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking 
on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 32 (2007) (“Unlike chess 
grandmasters, judges operate in an environment that does not allow them to perfect their intuitive 
decision-making process.”).  Judges only receive external validation or invalidation in the rare 
instances when their rulings are challenged on appeal.  Considerable time has elapsed by the time 
a judge reads a reversal or law review article criticizing an opinion, as Judge Richard Posner 
observed in a conversation about his recent book, How Judges Think, with students in David 
Levi’s and Mitu Gulati’s Duke Law School class.  Interview, A Conversation With Judge Richard 
A. Posner, 58 DUKE L.J. 1807, 1813 (2009). 
 33. No. 400454, 2002 WL 31833731, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 2002). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at *1–2. 
 36. See id. at *5 n.25 (recognizing in Popov’s argument language rejected by Pierson v. 
Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) regarding the capture of wild animals). 
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zero-sum decision awarding the ball to either party on these facts would simply 
be unfair to the other.37 
“The first part of solving a mystery,” Lehrer writes, “is realizing that there 
is no easy solution.”38  Judge McCarthy convened a session of court at the 
University of California, Hastings College of the Law to hear a panel of four 
law professors participate in a forum on the law of possession.39  The 
professors predictably disagreed about the definition of possession.40  “We are, 
therefore, left with something of a dilemma,” Judge McCarthy wrote.41  
According to Lehrer, more rational thought will not help in these situations. 
“This is where feelings come into play.  When there is no obvious answer, . . . 
[m]ysteries require more than mere rationality.”42  Judge McCarthy used his 
equitable discretion to craft a somewhat novel but satisfying remedy: ordering 
that the baseball be sold and the proceeds divided equally between the 
competing claimants.43  Through this decision, Judge McCarthy secured a 
place in first-year property casebooks for his opinion44 and the sobriquet of 
Solomon-like for himself.45 
Of course, the problem with emotions is they have a tendency to run amok.  
“Whenever someone makes a decision, the brain is awash in feeling, driven by 
its inexplicable passions.  Even when a person tries to be reasonable and 
restrained, these emotional impulses secretly influence judgment.”46  This is 
why self-awareness, the capacity to recognize feelings as they occur, is the 
cornerstone of emotional intelligence.47  To avoid mistakes, a trial judge needs 
 
 37. Popov, 2002 WL 31833731, at *8. 
 38. LEHRER, supra note 2, at 231. 
 39. Popov, 2002 WL 31833731, at *3 & n.17. 
 40. Id. at *3. 
 41. Id. at *7. 
 42. LEHRER, supra note 2, at 231. 
 43. Popov, 2002 WL 31833731, at *8. 
 44. See, e.g., R. WILSON FREYERMUTH ET AL., PROPERTY AND LAWYERING 85–89 (2d ed. 
2006); SANDRA H. JOHNSON ET AL., PROPERTY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 49–55 
(3d ed. 2006); GRANT S. NELSON ET AL., CONTEMPORARY PROPERTY 34–43 (3d ed. 2008). 
 45. Dean E. Murphy, Solomonic Decree in Dispute Over Bonds Ball, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 
2002, at A24.  Whether the decision would have survived appellate review will never be known.  
The presumed “million dollar ball” sold at auction for only $450,000.  NICK TASLER, THE 
IMPULSE FACTOR: WHY SOME OF US PLAY IT SAFE AND OTHERS RISK IT ALL 97 (2008). 
  Popov’s share was insufficient to pay his legal fees to date, let alone finance an appeal.  
Attorney Martin Triano sued his former client to collect $473,530 in unpaid legal fees.  Id.  
Hayashi’s lawyer presumably agreed to take the case on a contingency fee basis.  Id. 
 46. LEHRER, supra note 2, at xi, xv. 
 47. See generally HOWARD GARDNER, FRAMES OF MIND: THE THEORY OF MULTIPLE 
INTELLIGENCES (1983) (proposing the theory of eight different types of intelligences, including 
intrapersonal intelligence, or self-awareness). 
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to always be aware of how he is thinking.48  “[T]hinking about thinking . . . 
helps us steer clear of stupid errors.”49 
The emotional brain should not always be trusted,50 as Judge Kevin Duffy 
discovered.  Judge Duffy presided over a bench trial of a lawsuit filed by 
Penthouse International against Dominion Federal Savings & Loan for 
breaching a commitment to participate in a loan of $35 million to finance a 
casino-hotel project in Atlantic City.51  Dominion’s share of the loan was twice 
the maximum amount it could lend to a single borrower by federal regulation.52  
When a sub-participant backed out of the deal too late to find a replacement,53 
Dominion desperately needed a way out of its commitment without incurring 
liability.54  “In this plot they found a willing tool in [attorney Phillip] 
Gorelick.”55  Judge Duffy found that Gorelick was retained to serve as 
“Dominion’s hatchet man,” who worked to “bully and intimidate” Penthouse 
by making an endless series of unreasonable demands until the commitment 
expired and Dominion was released from its obligation.56 
Judge Duffy found simply incredible Gorelick’s testimony that he could 
not have acted in bad faith for the purpose of destroying the deal because his 
client had never made him aware of its dilemma.57 
  Gorelick took the stand and attempted brazenly to lie to the court.  During 
cross-examination, the crucible of truth, Gorelick continuously shifted uneasily 
in the chair, sweated like a trapped liar, and the glaze that came over his shifty 
eyes gave proof to his continuing perjury.  His total lack of veracity was shown 
not only by his demeanor but by the shady practices he seemingly reveled 
in. . . .  The inferences to be drawn from Gorelick’s outrageous perjury are 
often the exact opposite of what he said.58 
Judge Duffy sua sponte held the members of Gorelick’s law firm jointly 
and severally liable for damages caused by their partner’s fraudulent conduct 
in the sum of $130 million, the lion’s share of which represented lost future 
profits from a hypothetical Penthouse casino-hotel.59  However, all of Judge 
 
 48. LEHRER, supra note 2, at 241. 
 49. Id. at 250. 
 50. Id. at 249. 
 51. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd. v. Dominion Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 665 F. Supp. 301, 302 
(S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
 52. Id. at 303. 
 53. Id. at 309. 
 54. See id. at 306. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 665 F. Supp. at 307–08. 
 57. Id. at 306. 
 58. Id. at 306 n.1, 306–07. 
 59. Id. at 312. 
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Duffy’s factual findings were categorically reversed on appeal as clearly 
erroneous, together with all of his conclusions of law.60 
Hardship cases spawned by the current economic crisis will test trial 
judges’ self-awareness of the effect of outrage and indignation on their 
decision-making.  In order to come up with the right answer, decision-makers 
will need to regulate their emotions which, as Lehrer writes,61 and Judge Duffy 
learned,62 can be impulsive. 
Self-awareness failed Miami-Dade County Circuit Court Judge Valerie 
Schurr in the summer of 2009, when for no good reason she granted a request 
by Joseph and Blanca Doyle for continuance of Republic Federal Bank’s 
residential mortgage foreclosure of their 8,300 square foot, $2.6 million 
home.63  Judge Schurr explained in her opinion: 
I was trying to make everybody happy.  We have so many foreclosures here 
and I give continuances on these sales.  I just do. . . .  [Y]ou know, people are 
having a hard time now.  They are having a difficult time.  Everybody knows 
it.  Businesses are failing.  People are losing money in the stock market.  You 
know, unemployment is high.  It’s just everybody knows that we are in a bad 
time right now and I hate to see anybody lose their home.64 
The Florida Court of Appeal rebuked Judge Schurr for “abuse of discretion 
in the most basic sense of that term.”65  Although granting continuances 
generally is within the trial judge’s discretion, “no judicial action of any kind 
can rest on such a foundation.”66  The sternly worded unanimous opinion 
quoted Justice Cardozo’s admonition that a judge “is not to yield to spasmodic 
sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence.”67 
Similarly, a Long Island couple was left debt-free, and a Suffolk County 
judge was left without adjectives, after the court heard testimony from the 
regional manager for IndyMac Bank in a foreclosure matter.68  The lender’s 
intransigent refusal to restructure the couple’s sub-prime loan, or otherwise 
 
 60. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd. v. Dominion Fed. Savings & Loan Ass’n, 855 F.2d 963, 975–87 (2d 
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1005 (1989).  Perhaps proving how the brain learns from 
mistakes, Judge Duffy went on to preside ably over the high-profile criminal trial of the four 
principal perpetrators of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.  Judge Duffy sentenced each 
defendant to more than 100 years in prison.  See United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 108 (2d 
Cir. 1998). 
 61. LEHRER, supra note 2, at 89. 
 62. See generally Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 855 F.2d 863. 
 63. Republic Fed. Bank v. Doyle, 19 So. 3d 1053, 1054 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
 64. Id. at 1054 n.1. 
 65. Id. at 1054. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 1054–55 (quoting BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 
141 (1921)). 
 68. IndyMac Bank v. Yano-Horoski, 890 N.Y.S.2d 313, 315, 320 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009). 
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cooperate in avoiding foreclosure was, according to Judge Jeffrey Spinner, not 
only “harsh, repugnant, shocking and repulsive,” but also “inequitable, 
unconscionable, vexatious and opprobrious.”69  Noting that “Suffolk County is 
in the yawning abyss of a deep mortgage and housing crisis with foreclosure 
filings at a record high rate,”70 Judge Spinner sua sponte invoked his equitable 
jurisdiction to void the mortgage, erasing the $292,500 principal balance and 
an additional $235,000 in accrued interest and penalties.71 
Lehrer suggests strategies to compensate for a failure of self-awareness.  
The technique, familiar to crossword puzzle solvers, of setting complex 
decisions aside while the decision-maker goes on holiday—or gets some 
sleep—distracts the unconscious mind and affords it time to digest the 
information gathered by the conscious mind.72  Decision-making also benefits 
from an environment in which competing hypotheses are entertained.73  Lehrer 
suggests picking a fight with yourself (or, better yet, your law clerk) to create 
inner dissonance and overcome the “certainty trap.”74 
Described elsewhere as a thinking man’s Blink,75 How We Decide is 
reminiscent of Malcolm Gladwell’s bestseller76 in tone and literary style.  
Lehrer’s book is better annotated, with a complete bibliography and citations 
to psychology and neuroscience literature.  Both feature riveting stories 
(Lehrer’s include dramatic accounts of surviving a forest fire and the total loss 
of hydraulic control in a DC-10 cockpit)77 and fascinating experiments (some 
 
 69. Id. at 319. 
 70. Id. at 317. 
 71. See id. at 316–17, 320.  It is ironic that the sub-prime mortgage crisis itself is the result 
of lenders taking advantage of a failure of self-awareness on the part of borrowers whose 
emotions caused them to respond impulsively to artificially low “teaser” interest rates.  LEHRER, 
supra note 2, at 87–89. 
 72. LEHRER, supra note 2, at 237. 
 73. Cf. id. at 217. 
 74. Cf. id.  Lehrer calls attention to famous reports that Abraham Lincoln understood the 
benefits of intellectual diversity and selected his cabinet members to ensure vigorous debate and 
discussion.  Id. at 218 (citing DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, TEAM OF RIVALS: THE POLITICAL 
GENIUS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, passim (2005)).  Lehrer also recounts that General Motors 
Chairman Alfred P. Sloan once adjourned a board meeting early. 
“Gentlemen,” Sloan said, “I take it we are all in complete agreement on the decision here. 
. . .  Then I propose we postpone further discussion of this matter until our next meeting to 
give ourselves time to develop disagreement and perhaps gain some understanding of 
what the decision is all about.” 
Id. at 218 (alteration in original). 
 75. See, e.g., David Dobbs, “How We Decide”—The Thinking Person’s “Blink”, SCIENCE 
BLOGS.COM (Jan. 25, 2009, 10:45 PM), http://scienceblogs.com/neuronculture/2009/01/how_we_ 
decide_-_the_thinking_p.php. 
 76. MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING (2005). 
 77. LEHRER, supra note 2, at 93–96, 122–27. 
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of which have been reported elsewhere, though not as well).78  If there is a flaw 
in How We Decide, it is the author’s failure to acknowledge his considerable 
debt to pioneering work in the field of emotional intelligence by psychologists 
Howard Gardner and Daniel Goleman.79 
This remarkably insightful book deserves to be widely read and certainly 
deserves to be consulted before making any further decisions. 
  
 
 78. For example, the famous Stanford “marshmallow” longitudinal study of delayed 
gratification in children was previously reported, among others, by Daniel Goleman.  DANIEL 
GOLEMAN, EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE 80–83 (1995). 
 79. See, e.g., GARDNER, supra note 47; GOLEMAN, supra note 78. 
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